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Chapter 17
Investment and Administrative
Constraints on Individual
Social Security Accounts
Robert C. Pozen and John M. Kimpel
Several practical issues would become important if Congress decided to
allow a modest portion of the OASDI contribution (currently 12.4 percent
of annual compensation up to $68,400 for 1998) to be directed toward an
individual social security account. Such an individual account would pro-
vide a variable part of a participant's social security benefit in addition to a
guaranteed social security floor. For example, Congress could decide to
enact legislation similar to the Kerry-Simpson bilP with its 2 percent contri-
bution to "Personal Investment Plans," which would supply a supplemental
social security benefit in addition to certain guaranteed social security pay-
ments. Alternatively, Congress could adopt the proposal by two members of
the last Advisory Council on Social Security for a 1.6 percent Individual
Account, or the proposal by five members of the Council for a 5 percent
Personal Security Account to be invested by individual participants. As
noted in Chapter 1, these proposals share the common strategy of convert-
ing the social security structure from one that is entirely defined benefit to
one that is partially defined contribution.
One practical issue that deserves attention is the range of investment
constraints that might be placed on individual social security accounts such
as those discussed in this volume. Another is the administrative alternatives
for implementing such an individual account system. We discuss both below.
Investment Constraints
Several approaches to investment alternatives might be adopted in an indi-
vidual account system. Since defined contribution plans shift the risk and
rewards of investment experience from the plan sponsor to the plan partici-
pant, investments that can be held in an individual account should seek to
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maximize individual choice. However, this goal may be moderated by a
desire to maintain an appropriate balance between risk and return for
investments that constitute part of the social security system.
One possible investment model is that of the Individual Retirement Ac-
count (IRA). IRAs currently allow an individual to choose among many
different investments. These include individual stocks and bonds, bank ac-
counts, mutual funds, and various types of physical commodities. It is, how-
ever, unclear whether Congress is prepared to allow a similar breadth of
investment choice in an individual social security account. Since this ac-
count is intended to provide part of a participant's social security benefit,
albeit a modest and variable portion of such a benefit, Congress may be
reluctant to allow participants to take a significant degree of risk in this
portfolio.
For example, Congress might prohibit participants from investing social
security contributions in any individual stock, bond, or commodity. Instead,
Congress might limit participant choices to diversified securities pools,
where the aggregate risk is reduced by investments in multiple issuers. Such
diversified pools could be in the form ofcommon trust funds maintained by
banks, separate accounts run by insurance companies, or mutual funds
managed by investment advisers. The Congressional view is also likely to be
influenced particularly by the level of guaranteed social security payments
under the reformed plan relative to the poverty line.
Another investment model is presented by the Federal Thrift Savings
Plan. That plan offers currently only three investment options, all of which
are diversified pools. One pool is a Government Securities Fund, which
purchases securities directly from the United States Treasury. The other two
pools, a Stock Index Fund (based on the S&P500) and a United States Debt
Index Fund (based on the Lehman Brothers Aggregate bond index), are
run by a private firm. This firm is selected through competitive bidding by
an independent body, the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board,
appointed by the President.
While the Thrift Savings Plan provides diversification at a low expense
rate, the range of investment choices is quite narrow. In fact, over 60 percent
of the assets of the Thrift Savings Plan are currently invested in the Govern-
ment Securities Fund. In practice, some participants might want returns
with reasonable risk from a diversified pool of smaller stocks or interna-
tional securities, rather than a S&P index fund. Other participants may want
the opportunity to choose among investment managers, instead of being
required to use the one selected by the Federal Retirement Thrift Invest-
ment Board. Among the 200 largest defined benefit plans, only 30 percent
of the assets are invested in bonds.2 Among Fidelity 401 (k) and other
participant-directed defined contribution plans, fixed income and money
market investments constitute less than 30 percent of assets.3
An intermediate model between the IRA and Thrift Savings Plan models
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would allow participants to direct some amount, say 2 or 5 percent of their
OASDI contributions, to any qualified provider offering an appropriate
array of diversified pools. A "qualified provider" could be defined as an
investment manager qualified under Section 3(38) of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA), which would limit qualification to in-
sured banks, insurance companies, and SEC registered investment advisers.
There could be additional qualifications, such as bonding and reporting,
designed to assure the integrity and solvency of providers.
An appropriate range of investments could be based on the model re-
flected in the regulations issued under Section 404(c) of ERISA. These
regulations require a provider to offer at least three diversified pools as
"core" options, each of which has materially different risk and return fea-
tures. One of these core options must be a money market fund, a managed
income account consisting of GICs and other stable value investments, or a
FDIC-insured bank account. In addition, providers who seek the benefit of
Section 404(c) must distribute to participants written material on each core
option, as well as other options available under the plan, designed to edu-
cate participants about the range of investment choices. Among other
things, such disclosure is intended to educate participants about the invest-
ment objectives of each option and the risk and return characteristics of
each such alternative.4
Under such an intermediate model, each qualified provider would have
to offer three core options, with risk and return characteristics similar
to those provided under the Thrift Savings Plan. But participants could
also choose among other diversified pool options that focused on subasset
classes, such as international stocks or small cap growth stocks. Providers
offering such alternatives would be required to meet disclosure require-
ments comparable to those required by ERISA.
Administrative Constraints
The administration of an individual account system should maximize in-
dividual control and minimize costs, but these objectives are difficult to
achieve because of the small size of many of these accounts. For example, if
only 2 percent of the OASDI contribution were invested in an individual
social security account, this would amount to only $600 invested per year for
the average social security participant. Moreover, social security payments
are made by most employers on a weekly basis, which would mean invest-
ments of $12 per week on average. If as much as 5 percent of pay were
invested in an individual social security account, as suggested by members of
the Advisory Council on Social Security proposing a Personal Security Ac-
count, it would amount to a $1500 annual contribution amount or only $30
per week.
The situation becomes even worse if we move beyond averages. Two-
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thirds (67 percent) ofall workers covered by social security earned less than
$25,000.5 As a consequence, one could expect two-thirds of those covered by
individual social security accounts to contribute less than $300 per year (or
less than $6 per week) if the contribution rate were 2 percent, and less than
$1,250 (ofless than $25 per week) if the contribution rate were 5 percent. In
other words, one of social security's greatest virtues-its universality-is
also one of its problems. Administering social security in its current defined
benefit form, without individual accounting or investment management
requirements, is expensive: 0.42 percent when expressed as a percentage of
contributions, and 0.57 percent when expressed as a percentage of benefits
paid (Mitchell 1998). This compares to the 0.09 percent cost of administer-
ing the considerably smaller Thrift Savings Plan (137 million vs. 2.3 million
workers), even though the Thrift Savings Plan cost includes individual ac-
counting and investment management expenses (Mitchell 1998) .
The universality of social security creates another administrative burden:
by covering all workers, social security must interface with all employers. Of
the approximately 6.5 million employers in the United States, 4 million have
fewer than 10 employees; almost 5.5 million have fewer than 250 employees.
Currently more than 5.4 million employers file their wage reports with social
security by paper and not electronically (NASI 1998). Contrast this to the
Federal Thrift Savings Plan, where the employer is the Federal Government
(this covers many different agencies, but virtually all of them submit wage
data electronically).
In the private plan arena, the average employer Fidelity deals with has
over 1,000 employees. Virtually all of them submit most contribution and
other data electronically (to do otherwise would require us to convert paper
data manually to electronic format for input to our recordkeeping system).
The high cost of manual data inputting is a barrier to providing a low-cost
defined contribution plan to small employers.
In addition to participant account size and employer size, the administra-
tive cost of individual social security accounts will be driven by the number
of annual transactions. The Social Security Administration's current trans-
actions are generally limited to the annual reconciliation of wage data (the
actual collection of weekly or less frequent payroll tax contributions is han-
dled by the Internal Revenue Service), and the payment of monthly benefits
to retirees. Contrast this to the typical private sector defined contribution
plan, where multiple investment options, daily transaction capabilities, and
24 hour telephone service are the norm. Last year, for example, Fidelity's
recordkeeping operation performed over 90 transactions per participant,
or over 450 million monetary transactions for 5 million participants. These
included periodic contribution allocations among investments, daily ex-
changes among investment options, and distributions. In addition, Fidel-
ity's recordkeeping operation handled over 140,000 telephone calls daily.
These are the costs of giving participants maximum control over the invest-
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ment of their accounts. The Federal Thrift Savings Plan, by contrast, curtails
monetary transactions (and thereby expenses) by limiting participant con-
trol (for example, by limiting investment options and by limiting the num-
ber of exchanges to once a month rather than daily).
What administrative system would provide the best compromise between
maximizing participant control over individual social security accounts and
retaining reasonable administrative costs? One possible administrative sys-
tem would be for the U.S. Treasury to continue to collect social security tax
payments from employers, and subsequently to send the individual account
portion to the provider selected by the participant. This system could oper-
ate through an additional page in the annual income tax filing, on which a
participant would compute his applicable OASDI tax, designate his pre-
ferred qualified provider, and direct the Treasury to deposit his monies in a
specific investment alternative offered by that provider.
While a governmental model would have the advantage of piggybacking
on existing procedures for collecting social security payments and making
Internal Revenue Service filings, it would have several disadvantages. First,
there would be a substantial delay between the collection of the social se-
curity payments and the transmission of funds to the individual account
provider. For example, 1998 social security payments could not be transmit-
ted to the investment provider until the social security Administration had
reconciled the individual's wage data and the Internal Revenue Service had
received the individual's tax return. This would probably not occur until the
end of 1999 or even the beginning of 2000. Second, this system would
impose a new computer burden on the Internal Revenue Service, an agency
already hard pressed to cope with its current computer demands. Pro-
cedures would have to be established to rectify any mistakes in individual
social security accounts, perhaps requiring participants to deal with both
the Social Security Administration and the Internal Revenue Service. Third,
requiring all allocations to be made by the Internal Revenue Service might
subject the individual account process to a broad range of government
constraints unrelated to the system itself (for instance, an elaborate set of
government contractor rules).
A different administrative model would piggyback an individual account
system on the existing 401 (k) plans offered by many employers to their
employees. Under this model, the 401 (k) plan's recordkeeper would allo-
cate the employee's 2 percent or 5 percent contribution to a sub-account
under the employer's 401 (k) plan, to be periodically invested under the
plan in the appropriate investment pool at the appropriate provider. Em-
ployers would have the same fiduciary responsibilities with respect to those
sub-accounts that they now have to the plan as a whole.
The latter model has the advantage of utilizing an existing processing
system in the private sector that has proved to be relatively efficient, but it
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too has several serious drawbacks. First, while 401 (k) plans are virtually
universal at large firms, they are almost nonexistent at small firms (although
the new SIMPLE plan created by Congress in 1996 is beginning to make a
dent). At present, however, only about 20 percent of employees working
for small businesses with fewer than 100 employees participate in any type
of pension plan. A national system for administering individual accounts
would therefore need another procedure to address employees of small
businesses as well as the self-employed. Second, participants in a 401 (k)
plan at a large firm may desire to invest their social security contributions
with financial institutions other than the provider involved in their 401 (k)
program. If a business must allocate contributions to several different pro-
viders, administrative costs would increase significantly. Third, it is unclear
who would absorb the incremental cost of piggybacking individual account
allocations on 401 (k) systems. Even some large employers may not want to
take on the task of implementing an individual social security account sys-
tem. A result of these drawbacks, this model may best serve as an optional
administrative arrangement for those employers willing to undertake it.
Yet a third administrative model would be to utilize the procedures devel-
oped for annual IRA contributions. Under this scenario, a participant
would instruct his or her employer to withhold only 10.4 percent or 7.4
percent (rather than 12.4 percent) of his or her paycheck for OASDI payroll
tax. Then, each participant would periodically (perhaps annually) deposit 2
or 5 percent of his wages in an individual account at a qualified provider
selected by the participant. He would then submit to the IRS a receipt for
such contribution along with his income tax form. While this IRA model
would minimize bureaucratic constraints and maximize individual control,
the Treasury is likely to express concerns about possible social security
fraud. The Treasury would have difficulty ferreting out those individuals
who falsified receipts, underpaid their social security tax, or simply forgot to
make a deposit.
A variant of the IRA model could be developed to address Treasury's con-
cerns. Under this variant, Treasury would continue to collect all social secu-
rity payments, but a participant could obtain a tax credit ifhe chose to make
contributions to a qualified provider selected by the participant. Accord-
ingly, participants could make an individual account contribution to pro-
viders of their choice and reduce their tax payments on their income tax
filings. Alternatively, participants could reduce their withholding taxes or
estimated taxes to reflect their anticipated tax credit. This variant gives par-
ticipants maximum control over their individual social security accounts,
though it does require participants to adjust their tax payments in order to
avoid advancing the government the amount of their contributions. In addi-
tion, the tax credit should be refundable for participants who are not cur-
rently paying income tax. This variant, however, shifts much of the admin-
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istrative complexities imposed on the employer under the 401 (k) model to
the individual. While it may be a workable solution for many individuals, it
may be simply too complicated for others.
Under another variant of this alternative, participants could avoid adjust-
ing their withholding and writing a check by instead presenting a copy of
their W-2 form to the qualified provider of their choice and requesting that
their tax credit be sent directly by the Internal Revenue Service to such
provider. By establishing such a system (which perhaps could be built on the
existing electronic refund system), participants would be sure to have the
funds available to make the contribution. While such an alternative elimi-
nates the need for writing a check, it might share some of the problems
described above with regard to the governmental model (such as the poten-
tial delay between the collection of the social security payments and the
transmission of the contribution to the qualified provider).
Conclusion
This discussion suggests that a system of individual social security accounts
can be designed with a reasonable range of investment choices. Arguments
can be made for very broad or very narrow investment choices, but the most
powerful case is from an array ofdiversified investment pools including one
stable value fund. Such an array of options has worked for private pension
plans under ERISA by providing a reasonable balance between risk and
return.
The administrative issues posed by a system of individual social security
accounts is more difficult to resolve. The 401(k) model would be attractive
to some large employers, but most small employers will not want to partici-
pate in such a program. The Treasury could both collect social security taxes
and allocate contributions under a governmental model, but this would be a
bureaucratic and slow system with relatively little individual control. By con-
trast, an IRA model maximizes individual control and minimizes bureau-
cracy, but may be vulnerable as a tax collection system. The best middle
ground, in our view, is an IRA-type model under which the Treasury would
continue to collect social security taxes and participants would be allowed a
tax credit upon making their own individual account contributions. But this
model might shift too much of the administrative burden to participants
to be universally accepted. Perhaps the best result would be a program en-
compassing multiple solutions. It is not hard to envision a scenario where
some employees held individual social security accounts in their employer's
401 (k) plans, while others held them in an IRA.
In any event, the administrative issues presented by individual social se-
curity accounts are significant. The factors most affecting administrative
costs are account size, employer size, and number of transactions. Further
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analysis of the effect of these factors on the various individual account pro-
posals needs to be done before any of them are implemented.
Notes
1. S. 825, 104th Congress. Similar bills have been introduced by others.
2. Overall assets for the 200 largest DB plans were divided as follows: stocks, 60
percent; bonds, 30.5 percent; and other, 9.4 percent (Barr 1998).
3. Fidelity is the nation's largest defined contribution plan recordkeeper, with over
6,000 plans covering more than five million participants. As of 12/31/97, invest-
ment allocations (excluding company stock) were as follows: equities, 75 percent;
fixed income and GIC, 17 percent; and money market, 8 percent.
4. See Labor Regulations 2550.404c-l (b)(2) (B) (l) (ii). More extensive informa-
tion must be disclosed on request, including a description of the annual operating
expenses which reduce the rate of return on the diversified pool.
5. Office of the Actuary, SSA, as cited in NASI (1998).
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